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ABSTRACT 
111 
The notion of a reservation value is a key feature of most contemporary dynamic and 
stochastic models of land development. It is clear that the magnitude of the reservation value has a 
fundamental bearing on the decision to develop or preserve land. This notwithstanding, many papers 
that analyze land development in a dynamic and stochastic setting treat a landowner's reservation 
value as an exogenous variable. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to endogenize the reservation 
value in the context of a model of land development over time and under uncertainty. Our analysis 
shows that the optimal reservation value is the solution to a specific maximization problem. In 
addition, we also show that there exist theoretical circumstances in which the optimal reservation 
value is unique. 
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ENDOGENIZING THE RESERVATION VALUE IN 
MODELS OF LAND DEVELOPMENT OVER 
TIME AND UNDER UNCERTAINTyl 
1. Introduction 
The question of land developmnt in an intertemporal setting has interested economists and 
regional scientists at least since Weisbrod (1964). Since the, researchers such as Markusen and 
Scheffman (1978), Amott and Lewis (1979), and Capozza and Helsley (1989) have studied various 
aspects of the land development question in a deterministic environment. However, we now know 
that when the land development decision is irreversible, the use of a certainty framework will bias 
results about when land ought to be developed. In fact, as we have learned from the investment 
under uncertainty literature,2 uncertainty will generally impart an option value to undeveloped land 
and delay the development of land from, say, agricultural to urban use. Therefore, if we are to really 
understand when land ought to be developed in the presence of an irreversibility, it is essential that 
we explicitly account for uncertainty. 
Recently, Capozza and Helsley (1990), Batabyal (2003), Batabyal and Yoo (2003) and others 
have examined the question of land development over time and under uncertainty. In the context of 
a "first hitting time" problem,3 Capozza and Helsley (1990) show that land ought to be converted 
from rural to urban use at the first instance in which the land rent exceeds the reservation rent. 
Batabyal (2003) first supposes that a landowner has a reservation value in mind, say $A, below which 
I We thank Yoshiro Higano and two anonymous referees for their comments on a previous version of this paper. 
In addition, Batabyal acknowledges fmancial support from the Gosnell Endowment at RlT. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2For more on this literature, see Pindyck (1991), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Hubbard (1994). 
3For additional details on this, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 83-84) and Ross (1996, pp. 363-366). 
he will not agree to develop his land. Batabyal then shows that this landowner's decision rule is to 
accept the fIrst bid to develop land that exceeds $A . Batabyal and Y 00 (2003) analyze the properties 
of a decision rule that calls for land development as long as the dollar value of a bid exceeds a 
stochastic reservation level ofrevenue. These authors show that although the likelihood of developing 
land with the above decision rule is always positive, on average, a landowner who uses this decision 
rule will always end up preserving his land. 
As this briefreview ofthe theoretical literature shows, many models ofland development over 
time and under uncertainty have utilized the notion of a reservation value. In addition, the work of 
Barnard and Butcher (1989), Tavernier and Li (1995), and Tavernier et al. (1996) tells us that even 
the elnpiricalliterature on land deve10plnent has made use of the concept of a reservation value. A 
perusal of these theoretical and empirical papers tells us that the magnitude of a landowner's 
reservation value has a significant impact on the decision to develop or preserve land. This 
notwithstanding, in most ofthe papers that we have just discussed, the reservation value is exogenous 
to the analysis. Consequently, we use a theoretical model of land development over time and under 
uncertainty to endogenize the reservation value. Our subsequent analysis will demonstrate that a 
landowner's optimal reservation value is the solution to a particular maximization problem. We shall 
also show that there exist theoretical circumstances in which this optimal reservation value is unique. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 provides a detailed description of 
the theoretical framework. Section 2.2 uses this framework to set up a maximization problem for our 
landowner. Section 2.3 shows that the optimal reservation value is the solution to the above 
maxiInization problem. Section 2.4 presents a numerical example and discusses the dependence of 
our results on the underlying assumptions. Section 3 concludes and offers suggestions for future 
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research on the subject of this paper. 
2. Land Development Over Time and Under Uncertainty 
2.1. The Theoretical Framework 
Our model is based on the discussion in Batabyal (2003), Batabyal and Yoo (2003), and Ross 
(2003, pp. 288-301). Consider a landowner who owns a plot ofland. The decision problem faced by 
this owner concerns when to develop his plot ofland. Consistent with the analysis in Batabyal (2003) 
and in Batabyal and Yoo (2003), we suppose that the development decision is indivisible. In other 
words, the possibility of partial development of the plot is excluded. The landowner solves his 
problem in a dynamic and stochastic setting. The setting is stochastic because the decision to develop 
depends fundamentally on the receipt of non-negative and dollar-valued bids to develop land. 
Following Batabyal (2004), we suppose that these bids are received in accordance with a Poisson 
process with rate cp.6 The decision making framework of our paper is dynamic in the sense that this 
framework requires the landowner to decide when land ought to be developed on the basis of his 
observations-over time-ofthe Poisson bid receipt process . 
To keep the subsequent analysis interesting, we suppose that each bid to develop land is the 
value ofa continuous random variable with density function h(b). Now, once a bid is received by our 
landowner, he must decide whether to accept it (agree to develop his land) or reject it (preserve his 
land) and wait for additional bids. When our landowner decides to preserve his land, he incurs 
benefits and costs. The benefits arise from things like the preservation of the option to develop land 
t In addition to the literature on land development over time and under uncertainty, the Poisson process has been widely used in the 
natural resource economics and mathematical ecology literatures. For a more detailed corroboration of this claim, see Uhler and 
Bradley (1970) , Peilou (1977) , Arrow and Chang (1980), and Batabyal (2004). For lucid textbook accounts of the Poisson process, 
see Ross (1996, pp. 59-97) or Ross (2003, pp. 269-348). 
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later and the costs arise from things like the need to prevent encroachment and the need to maintain 
the plot ofland under study. As such, when a decision to preserve land has been made, our landowner 
incurs net costs (in $) at a rate of c per unit time until the land is developed. 
Our landowner's objective is to maximize his expected total profit where the total profit 
equals the dollar amount received upon acceptance of a bid less the net cost incurred. Now, 
consistent with the approach taken in Cappoza and Helsley (1990); in Batabyal (2003) and in 
Batabyal and Yoo (2003), we suppose that our landowner's reservation value is r and that this 
landowner will accept the first bid that exceeds r in dollar terms. The task before us now is to 
endogenously determine the optimal value of this reservation value r. 
2.2. The Maximization Problem 
To determine the optimal value of r, we shall first calculate our landowner's expected total 
profit when the decision rule described in the previous paragraph is used and then we shall choose 
the value of r that maximizes the expression for our landowner's expected total profit. 
Let B denote the value of an arbitrary bid and let H C(b) denote the tail distribution of this 
bid. In symbols, we have HC(b)=Prob{B>b} = fh(w)dw. Now note that each bid will exceed the 
b 
reservation value r with probability HC(r). Therefore, we can tell that these sorts of bids will be 
received by our landowner in accordance with a Poisson process with rate ~H C(r). Accordingly, the 
time until a particular bid is accepted by our landowner is an exponentially distributed random 
variable with rate ~H C(r). 
Now let us denote the total profit from the decision rule that involves accepting the first bid 
that exceeds r by TI(r). Then it should be clear to the reader that the expectation of this total profit 
is E[TI(r)] =E[accepted bid] -E[c(time until bid accepted)]. Mathematically, the equation we get 
4 
IS 
E[Il(r)] =E[BIB>r] C (1) 
The conditional expectation on the right-hand-side (RRS) of equation (1) can be simplified further 





b h(b) db. 
orr H C(r) 
(2) 




We now have our landowner's objective, i.e., expected total profit in the form in which we would 
like. To determine the optimal reservation value, our landowner will need to choose r to maximize 
the RHS of equation (3). We now tum to this task. 
2.3. The Optimal Reservation Value 
As indicated in the previous section, to compute the optimal r, our landowner solves 
jbh(b)db-C(f> -1 





Taking the derivative of the maximand in equation (4) and then setting it equal to zero gives us the 
first order necessary condition for an optimum. We get 
fbh(b)db- : =rHC(r). (5) 
r 
Now using the fact that rH C(r)=r fh(b)db, we can simplify equation (5). This simplification gives 
r 
f(b-r)h(b)db= :. (6) 
r 
The landowner's optimal reservation value, r *, is the solution to equation (6). 
Is the above solution unique? To answer this question, let us investigate this solution in 
somewhat greater detail. To this end, let us define k + to be equal to k if k>O and to be equal to 0 
otherwise. With this definition in place, note that the left-hand-side (LHS) of equation (6) can be 
written as 
f (b -r)h(b )db=E[(B -r) +J. (7) 
r 
Now observe that (B -r) + is a non-increasing function of r. Therefore, from well known properties 
of the expectation operator,1 it follows that E[(B-rfJ is also a non-increasing function of r. This 
last result tells us that the LHS of equation (6) is a non-increasing function of r. Given this line of 
5 See Ross (2003, pp. 97-179). 
reasoning, we can now see that if c/cp>E[B] , then there is no solution to equation (6) and it is optimal 
for our landowner to agree to develop his land upon receipt of any bid. In contrast, if c/cp~E[B] , then 
the optimal reservation value r * is the unique so lution to equation (6). The reader will note that there 
is nothing in our model that would suggest that the condition c/cp~E[B] is unreasonable. 
Consequently, we conclude that reasonable theoretical circumstances exist in which the landowner's 
optimal reservation value is unique. 
2.4. A Numerical Example 
We now illustrate the working of our model with a numerical example. For the purpose 0 f this 
example, we suppose that cp=2, c=$3 , and that h(') is uniform over the range from $0 to $100. This 
tells us that H C(r) =(1 00 -r)/l 00. Substituting these values in equation (3) and then simplifying the 




Now maximizing the right-hand-side of equation (8) with respect to r yields a quadratic equation in r 
and that equation is 2r2-400r+ 19400=0. The solutions to this equation are rl* =117.32 and 
r2* =82.68. Hence it is clear that in this particular example, the landowner's optimal reservation value 
is r * =$82.68 . 
The results of the analysis of a mathematical model typically depend on the underlying 
assumptions employed in this model and our paper is no exception to this generalization. Having said 
this, the reader should note that two important functions in our analysis, i.e. , the h(') function and 
the H C(.) function are general. The only specific assumption that we have employed in our analysis 
7 
is to model the bid receipt process with a Poisson process. However, as indicated in footnote 6, the 
Poisson process has been widely used previously to model natural resource and related phenomena. 
Therefore, our results are quite general. We now conclude this section by pointing out that the 
analysis in this paper can be made even more general by modeling the bid receipt process with a 
renewal process. 
3. Conclusions 
The decision to develop or preserve land is fundamentally contingent on the magnitude of a 
landowner's reservation value in many contemporary models of land developlnent over time and 
under uncertainty. This notwithstanding, the reservation value concept is typically an exogenous 
variable in present-day analyses of the land development problem. As such, we used an intertemporal 
and probabilistic framework to show that the reservation value concept can be usefully endogenized. 
We fIrst showed that the optimal reservation value r * is the solution to a particular maximization 
problem. We then pointed out that reasonable theoretical circumstances exist in which this optimal 
reservation value is unique. 
The analysis in this paper can be extended in a number of directions. In what follows, we 
suggest two possible extensions. First, the reader will note that we studied a situation in which a 
landowner knows that the stochastic bid receipt process is a Poisson process. As pointed out in 
section 2.1, this is a routinely used stochastic process in the land development literature in particular 
and in the natural resource economics literature in general. Even so, as discussed in section 2.4, it 
would be useful to see how the underlying analysis changes when the bid receipt process is a (more 
general) renewal process. Second, it would be useful to determine what happens to the optimal 
reservation value when the net cost per unit incurred by a landowner is not constant but varying over 
8 
time. Studies that analyze these aspects of the problem will provide additional insights into the role 
that endogenous reservation values play in the development ofland over time and under uncertainty. 
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1. Introduction 
The question of land development in an intertemporal setting has interested economists and 
regional scientists at least since Weisbrod (1964). Since then, researchers such as Markusen and 
Scheffman (1978), Arnott and Lewis (1979), and Capozza and Helsley (1989) have studied various 
aspects of the land development question in a deterministic environment. However, we now know 
that when the land development decision is irreversible, the use of a certainty framework will bias 
results about when land ought to be developed. In fact, as we have learned from the investment under 
uncertainty literature,4 uncertainty will generally impart an option value to undeveloped land and 
delay the development of land from, say, agricultural to urban use. Therefore, if we are to really 
understand when land ought to be developed in the presence of an irreversibility, it is essential that 
we explicitly account for uncertainty. 
Recently, Capozza and Helsley (1990), Batabyal (2003), Batabyal and Yoo (2003) and others 
have examined the question of land development over time and under uncertainty. In the context of 
a "fIrst hitting time" problem/ Capozza and Helsley (1990) show that land ought to be converted 
from rural to urban use at the fIrst instance in which the land rent exceeds the reservation rent. 
Batabyal (2003) fIrst supposes that a landowner has a reservation value in mind, say $A, below which 
4 
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